



Early Journal Content on JSTOR, Free to Anyone in the World

This article is one of nearly 500,000 scholarly works digitized and made freely available to everyone in the world by JSTOR.

Known as the Early Journal Content, this set of works include research articles, news, letters, and other writings published in more than 200 of the oldest leading academic journals. The works date from the mid-seventeenth to the early twentieth centuries.

We encourage people to read and share the Early Journal Content openly and to tell others that this resource exists. People may post this content online or redistribute in any way for non-commercial purposes.

Read more about Early Journal Content at <http://about.jstor.org/participate-jstor/individuals/early-journal-content>.

JSTOR is a digital library of academic journals, books, and primary source objects. JSTOR helps people discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content through a powerful research and teaching platform, and preserves this content for future generations. JSTOR is part of ITHAKA, a not-for-profit organization that also includes Ithaka S+R and Portico. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

WORLD-POLITICS.

LONDON : ST. PETERSBURG : BERLIN : WASHINGTON.

LONDON, *May, 1906.*

ENGLAND discussing an Education Bill is a curious spectacle. No one who has once witnessed it would ever again describe education as a dull subject. The excitement it produces, the passions and even the ferocities aroused by it in this country, have a scale and a depth that would probably astound and mystify an American. That is mainly because when Englishmen engage in an educational controversy the last subject they mention is education. An Education Bill in the English Parliament always resolves itself into a battle, not between educational "experts," but between rival sets of theologians. English history and conditions, and certain peculiarities of the English temperament, have made it inevitable that this should be so. The fact, however, is none the less deplorable, deplorable from almost every standpoint, and not least from that of educational efficiency. It gives aid and comfort to those manifold influences that prevent the English people from regarding education seriously and by itself. I well remember that, some three years ago, the late Bishop of London startled his countrymen by declaring that "England has a contempt for knowledge." Dr. Creighton knew whereof he spoke. If any man's experience could be thought wide enough to justify so grave and comprehensive an indictment, his could. Like most English Bishops, he began life as a schoolmaster; he was for many years a great teaching professor; he was also a historian who held his own with Froude, Lecky, Freeman, Green and Gardiner; he had come into contact, more or less intimate, with thousands of young men; and from the high position to which he eventually climbed he looked abroad with keen, wide-opened eyes. And that was the conclusion to which his busy and varied life had

forced him—that the English despise knowledge, are intellectually lazy, trust far too complacently to their “practical qualities,” and betake themselves to scientific study “in a spirit of condescension.”

I am myself very much of Dr. Creighton’s opinion. There are, it is true, some hopeful signs of an awakening, but it is still broadly true that the English are not really in earnest about education and that it remains a cause to which they will pay lip service, but for which they will not take off their coats.

The State spends an enormous amount of money—at present something like \$70,000,000 a year on primary education alone—but I do not think it gets the best results. The elementary schools, through the policy on which they are administered, suffer by being made the battle-ground of fanatical sectarians. A national system of secondary education can hardly as yet be said to exist in England. In technical education little more than a beginning has been made. The Universities, while their spirit and atmosphere are admirable and their standards of scholarship most valiantly maintained, are hampered by an insufficient and outworn curriculum. An Englishman, indeed, who was asked to signify the most useful and creditable and distinctive features of education in England would probably end by pointing to some such seminaries as Eton and Rugby; and even they do far more to mould the characters than the minds of their pupils.

Manufacturing and commercial England is at least a generation behind both Germany and America in its recognition of the value of scientific instruction. Perhaps it would not be overstating the case to say that in none of the leading industrial countries is the educational system so divorced from, and of so little use to, the nation’s business. Instances abound where important manufactures have been wrested from the English because their rivals have adopted more scientific methods.

Nor are these the only difficulties with which the cause of English education has to contend. That supreme belief in education as the indispensable ladder to success which pervades and animates America appears, by contrast, to be all but inoperative in England. The average Englishman, especially among the poorer classes, is not only less curious-minded, less eager for information, than the average American, but he lacks one of the

main incentives to the acquirement of knowledge—the incentive of feeling that there are a thousand chances ahead of him which knowledge alone will enable him to utilize. His horizon is narrower and the scope of his opportunity more contracted.

It is difficult to convey to Americans, except in a general way, any idea of the educational situation in England. Roughly speaking, the opinion of this country is opposed to a purely secular system of public education. It has no wish to banish religion from the schools. Yet it is equally opposed to paying, out of public moneys, whether rates or taxes, for the teaching of one denominational creed in preference to another, and it is scarcely less willing to accept the theory that the State should provide for instruction in all denominational creeds. Between furnishing equal facilities for all sects and no facilities for any sect, it has for the past five and thirty years adopted a compromise. This compromise found expression in the famous Cowper-Temple clause of the Act of 1870, the Act which first gave to England what Americans would call a public-school system. That clause declared: "No religious catechism or religious formula which is distinctive of any particular denomination shall be taught in the school." The clause did not apply to the Voluntary Schools—that is, the schools built, endowed and owned by the Established Church; and it was accompanied by a "conscience clause" under which a child might be withdrawn from religious lessons. The system has worked fairly well. The Church-of-England schools have continued to teach the Church-of-England doctrines, and the public elementary schools have expounded the fundamental truths of Christianity in a way acceptable to both Anglicans and Non-conformists. But if, from the theological standpoint, the compromise worked passably, from the educational standpoint it proved a failure. The public elementary schools were managed by local elective bodies called School Boards. They came into existence as occasion demanded. "Distributed haphazard over the country, the areas in which they operated were irregular; they had no jurisdiction over the Voluntary Schools in their districts; they had unlimited powers of expenditure, while rating authorities were obliged to honor their precepts without question." Moreover, they were unconnected with and uncontrolled by the authorities responsible for secondary technical education. At the same time, the Voluntary

Schools, being supported not from the rates but by the private subscriptions of Anglicans and by grants-in-aid from the Government, drifted into a very unsatisfactory condition, many of their buildings being defective and ill-equipped, and the education provided in them falling short of the proper standards. Both the undenominational and the denominational schools stood, therefore, in need of reform. But the difficulties of reforming them, of putting them on a sure foundation, and at the same time of reconciling the religious differences involved, were greatly increased by the facts that over half the children of England are educated in the Voluntary Schools, and that in several thousand villages the Voluntary School is the only school.

The Act of 1902 met these difficulties in the following way: It abolished the School Boards and made the local County or Borough Council the supreme education authority for the district, with equal power over the secular curriculum in both public and Voluntary schools. That was a great gain and a great step towards efficiency. The Voluntary Schools, at the same time, were made a public charge and thrown on the rates, the Established Church thus being relieved from the necessity of supporting them. In return for this, the managers of the Voluntary Schools were required to provide the school buildings, free of charge, for use as a public elementary school, to keep them in repair, and to make reasonable alterations and improvements if required. On the other hand, they retained the right of teaching their own doctrines in the schools; no teacher appointed or dismissed by them could be discharged or reinstated by the local education authority except on purely educational grounds; and in the management of the Voluntary Schools four directors were to be appointed by the local Churchmen and two by the local education authority. Against these provisions, the Dissenters strongly protested on the ground that the rates were being used to support a denominational creed; that, while the people were finding the money for the support of the Voluntary Schools, they had only a very partial and incomplete control over them; and that the Act practically excluded qualified teachers from the majority of the schools because they were not members of the Established Church.

I believe there was a certain substance in these complaints, and that, especially in places where the only existing school was

a Voluntary School, the Act worked harshly for conscientious Dissenters. But I am not at all sure that Mr. Birrell's Act, introduced a month ago and now the subject of furious debates in the House, does not commit an equal injustice against the Church. Mr. Birrell proposes to bring the Voluntary Schools under the full and entire control of the local education authorities. The religious instruction to be given in them must be purely undenominational, though on two mornings in the week, out of school hours, at their own expense and through the medium of specially imported teachers, the owners of any Voluntary School may provide religious instruction according to their own creed for such as care to receive it. Where the parents of four-fifths of the children desire it, a school in an urban area may still continue to exist as a denominational school, and the teachers employed in the school may dispense the religious instruction required, but not at the public expense. The local education authority is to lease the schools from their present owners, paying rent for their use on five days in the week from nine in the morning until four in the afternoon, and bearing all the cost of maintaining the buildings, the present owners to retain exclusive possession of them during the whole of Saturday and Sunday and on week-day evenings. Finally, a Commission of three, presided over by a lawyer, is appointed by the bill to determine the best means of adapting to the new conditions the trust-deeds of all such Voluntary Schools as are dedicated in perpetuity to educational purposes. Such is the main outline of this momentous measure. It is being vehemently opposed by the Church; by the Irish Nationalists, who are fearful for the fate of the Catholic schools; by the Jews, who are similarly anxious on behalf of their own establishments; and by the Labor party, who almost to a man are in favor of a system of purely secular education. With such opponents against it, I see very little chance of the bill's passing in anything like its present form. If it does, I predict with confidence that the House of Lords will reject it. In any case, we are in for a peculiarly English uproar of almost measureless virulence. It may shake even this Government that reckons its normal majority by the hundreds. It must, I think, bring England a long step nearer to the admission that religious instruction is a thing not for the State but for the parents.

ST. PETERSBURG, May, 1906.

THE tug-of-war between the Russian Autocracy and Democracy will be in full swing before this article sees the light. It will be war to the death, with original Slav accompaniments. It is the second chapter of the revolution, the modest beginnings of which I described in the REVIEW of January, 1905. Nobody can tell what the vicissitudes will be, not even the friends of the Tsar, who are now busy strengthening the weak points in their rusty armor. They are making active preparations for the fray; but for their ordnance they are employing peculiarly weak material—paper—after the manner of the Chinese, who place in their fortresses wooden or papier-maché guns painted to look like steel cannon. Apprehending mischief from untamed deputies, M. Durnovo and his friends are hastily issuing a series of little laws wherewith to keep the activity of the Duma within what they think to be reasonable bounds. “This subject,” they say, “is taboo”; “that line ye shall not overstep,” and so on. The delegates are to be kept on their good behavior. As if a tidal wave of elemental force could be held back by means of paper barriers!

The Council of the Empire is the workshop where the armor and armaments for the Autocracy are now being made—the Council of the Empire, which is an asylum for fossil officials. There are old men there who cannot walk, stand or even sit down without help, and who, judging by the advice they give, cannot reason, even with considerable help. One of these is Count Pahlen, whom I knew as Minister of Justice in the reign of Alexander II thirty years ago. This hoary old invalid, whose native tongue is German, besought the Tsar to insert among the fundamental laws, which are to keep the new legislative assembly in bounds, one statute to the effect that no bill tending to facilitate or permit the expropriation of land for the purpose of selling it to the peasants shall be discussed or laid before the Duma. The word “expropriation” shall be struck out of the dictionary. Russian farmers, whose words and thoughts and dreams are of land, shall not be allowed to utter the word! Count Witté, when this extraordinary bill was brought forward by Count Pahlen, exclaimed: “If you really want to drive the peasantry to insurrection, to revolution, the insertion of that paragraph in the fundamental laws will achieve the feat. Suppose the

peasant delegates ignore your restrictive clauses and bring in a bill of the kind you would prohibit. What then?" "We would have them called to order." "And if they persisted, and the House upheld them?" "We would dismiss the House, dissolve the Duma, and—" "And inaugurate insurrection!" exclaimed the Premier.

The bill did not pass; but that is a secondary consideration. The source whence it emanated is perennial in the bureaucracy. The men who enjoy the Tsar's confidence are imbued with the idea that you can shut down the safety valve of a powerful empire, and then put on extra pressure. When Witté will have gone—and at this moment he is certainly going—his successors, if they be of the stamp of Durnovo and Count Pahlen, will constitute the gravest peril for monarch and nation.

The other danger, equally grave, comes from the opposite side. The Liberal section, known as Constitutional Democrats, will find it a very arduous task to abandon bunkum for business, and contribute to the welfare, instead of exciting the passions, of the people. They are bound by a whole litany of promises to work miracles and accomplish the impossible. Civil rights for the Jews, autonomy for the Poles and others, shorter hours for the workmen, more land for the peasantry and no capital punishment for the murderer are among the numerous new reforms to which they are understood to be pledged. The Government is resolved to refuse them. And the nation is in a hurry and cannot wait. The extreme Left will sit in judgment on the Democrats daily until they have done something to justify the hopes they now arouse. For hope is everywhere prevalent and is stifling effort. Centuries of paternal government have rendered the Russian people self-helpless. They put their trust in others and therefore do nothing themselves; they will not even aid the others who are succoring them. Heretofore, it was the Tsar and his officials to whom they looked as children look to their parents; now it is the Liberal Party, and in both cases they asked for the moon. Disappointment, if it come, will engender anger, and anger beget violence.

The agrarian problem, for instance, is waiting to confront every party in power like a cruel Sphinx, ready to tear them to pieces. Nobody seems able to lay the mighty spirit which it was so easy to invoke. Naturally, all these things induce pes-

simism, and everywhere prophecies of evil are rife. "The Duma will be dispersed with bayonets" is the usual formula; preparations for civil war in the shape of bombs and revolvers are the practical precautions adopted. But reasonable scepticism and benevolent hope befit the onlooker who has no stake in the game; and, above all, he should not judge the Russian by the standard he would apply to the American or the Briton. For he represents another type of civilization and a different race.

Even now a kind of civil war is being waged, although there is no rounded scheme and slight hope of success. Hence, political assassination, revolutionary arson, patriotic pillage are daily phenomena. We are almost grown accustomed to them as part of the established order of things. A band of armed men, sometimes disguised, attack a public institution or a private dwelling, seize and carry off the valuables it contains, and, if any resistance is offered, kill the men who dared to offer it and go their way unpunished. They are not vulgar criminals — very far from that; they are patriots, heroes, great men, to whom monuments are offered *in petto*. Even youths and children occasionally join in the work. Indeed, it is now becoming usual to employ children to throw bombs. The law cannot condemn children to death.

In Baku, a whole gang of revolutionaries—disguised as policemen, officers of the gendarmes and State Attorneys—went around visiting offices kept by wealthy citizens, chiefly Mohammedans, on the pretext that they must search for treasonable documents; and then they abstracted banknotes, gold, securities and all other valuables that could be easily turned into money. The merchants who thus fell a prey to the ingenuity and lawlessness of the gang, had no suspicion that the "men of the law" were other than they represented themselves to be. Indeed, nobody knows who is who. Generals, monks, tram conductors, policemen, priests, may turn out to be revolutionaries in disguise, or detectives. Over a hundred and fifty thousand dollars have just been abstracted by a number of "soldiers" who appeared to relieve the guard on duty some five minutes before the proper time. The guard, suspecting nothing, went away, and the relief party relieved the safes of the large sum mentioned. In February alone, the shortest month of the year, twenty-six attempts were made to murder and a very large number of victims were actually killed.

An amazing incident, that sounds more like fiction than fact, occurred in Warsaw on April 23rd. In the Pavia gaol, there were a number of political prisoners characterized as "dangerous." Two among them had been sent for trial for having murdered a high official, one for having attempted to kill and the remainder for having put to death soldiers in the army. At eleven o'clock on the night of April 23rd, the Assistant-Governor of the prison was summoned to the telephone, to hear an order from the head police prefect, Colonel Meyer. He listened; it was Meyer's voice and intonation. There was no doubt in his mind on that point. The instructions were to get ready the prison van, that same night, to transfer ten of the most dangerous inmates, whose names he enumerated, to the citadel. The Assistant-Governor, whose hours of service were then expiring, transmitted the order to another assistant, who duly carried it out. At three in the morning, an officer of the gendarmes appeared at the head of ten constables. Introducing himself as Captain von Budberg, he presented the order of the Governor-General, typewritten on a printed form, properly signed and sealed. The Assistant Governor took the document, read it and then asked: "Will you not need an escort as well? There are ten prisoners and you have but ten constables. I shall give you—" "No, no. Thanks. That has been arranged for. I have a supplementary escort outside the walls." "Oh, very well."

The ten men were then taken from their cells and brought into the prison courtyard. It was still pitch dark, and semi-opaque lanterns threw an uncertain light on the features of the prisoners and their gaolers. Was there a smile on the faces of the conspirators? The "policemen" stood in two rows, face to face, resolute and gloomy. Between their ranks the doomed men entered the van in silence and took their places. Two of the constables also went inside and sat with them. Two others seated themselves on either side of the driver, two more guarded the door of the van and the remaining four followed on foot. They have never been heard of since. The driver was found gagged and bound, but otherwise unhurt, and, not far from the place where he was sitting, ten policemen's uniforms lay upon the ground. Truth is sometimes stranger than fiction.

The police and gendarmes who guard the imperial palace of

Tsarskoye Selo have had their wages raised by twenty-five per cent. since that mysterious rescue, and special precautions will in future be adopted to hinder assassins in the guise of gendarmes from entering palaces and Government buildings. Henceforth, every important order given by telephone will have to be verified. But against mistakes like that made by the Assistant Governor of the Warsaw gaol there is no absolute guarantee. And a mistake on the part of the authorities, say, at Tsarskoye Selo, might have terrible consequences.

The class of assassins is becoming numerous in Russia, and it is also growing influential. Two of the earliest measures, it is affirmed, which the entire Liberal party will introduce into the Duma, are an amnesty for all the men who have committed political murders in the past, and a law forbidding the Government to condemn to death any one guilty of that or any other offence in the future. The northern Slav feels pity for criminals, as well as for innocent victims, and hates capital punishment. Russians are Asiatics, and should not be judged by the American standard.

Gorky's mission to the United States, as emissary of the Revolutionary party, was an egregious blunder. For there are not many public men in the Tsardom less congenial to Americans than this Poet of Trampdom who knows no language but Russian and no manners but those of his former fellows. The circumstance that he was chosen for the mission shows how little Russian democrats understand Americans. They have other men in their ranks who are resourceful, diplomatic, civilized and sympathetic. But they chose Maxim Gorky, thinking that this incarnate protest against civilization would carry with him the people of the United States and reap a splendid harvest for the coming insurrection. That was their cardinal and initial mistake. All the rest followed inevitably. It was interesting, and at times amusing, to note the reflection upon Russian society here of what was being done in the United States. For instance, when Russian Radicals read of the enthusiastic greeting accorded to Gorky in New York, they were unable to write of the "free citizens of the Great Republic" in any tone but that of Byzantium, to which they were accustomed. Their praise was undiluted, their adjectives were nearly all superlatives. Mark Twain also came in for a puff of incense smoke, heavy enough

to have suffocated Shakespeare. Then occurred the painful finishing episode: the Russian writer who had gone up like a rocket came down like a stick, and thereupon all his political friends changed their views and sentiments in a twinkling. The American people, it was discovered, do not know how to treat women. Russian revolutionists can teach them. Mark Twain? A puffed-up nobody!

The American people have been attacked bitterly and rancorously for insulting a woman* who relied upon their hospitality, and the principal Radical organ here, in a powerful leading article, characterizes them thus: "Thomas Muntzer's cutting phrase is borne in upon our minds—a phrase which is, however, not only cutting but instinct with honest bitterness: 'A people who preach salvation by faith alone are mere fattened hogs!'" Poor Americans!

But, after all, the Yankees got off very cheaply with a paper protest. They may consider themselves much luckier than the French, who, for having lent their savings to Russia and saved her from ruin, are now to be boycotted by the whole Radical population. Happily, that section of the Russian people is not wont to lavish its spare cash upon dry champagne, generous burgundies, costly clarets and those other exports for which the wealthy non-boycotting classes pay.

Beyond the Tsar's dominions it is difficult to realize the mental attitude of the Russian Radical towards the loan. Logic blushes at it. One of the most powerful arguments adduced against the bureaucracy is the distress it has produced among the peasantry, who constitute the bulk of the nation. There is no doubt that the economic condition of the tillers of the soil is deplorable. The Liberals add that the peasantry are actually starving. That, too, is true of the population of some districts. Help is, therefore, needed immediately in the shape of financial relief, but the Government had no money. Another three months of that dearth of cash would have had dire and irremediable consequences; gold, which was already at a premium, would have definitely disappeared from the country, the Gov-

* It is but just to add that the reactionary *Novoye Vremya* published an article by the proprietor, M. Suvorin, in which he says: "To tell the Americans that they have insulted a woman is just as though a cock were to teach the nightingale to sing. . . . America is celebrated for its respect for women."

ernment would have probably been obliged to take refuge in the printing-press, and bankruptcy would have loomed large on the horizon. The poorest classes would, of course, have suffered soonest, most and longest, while the members of the Government would have wholly escaped. Yet the endeavors made to raise money abroad were thwarted in every way by the Radicals.

This defect of the logical sense and these peculiarities in the psychological equipment of the Russian, added to the abnormal frame of mind which specialists term "revolutionary neurasthenia," render it impossible for any one to foresee the words and deeds of the deputies of the Duma or to forecast the policy of the Government. I may, however, state my personal opinion. The leaders of the Democratic party, which in all probability will gain the upper hand in the new representative chamber, are keenly alive to the necessity of proving to the world that they are not devoid of the political qualities which a great national party should possess. They will, consequently, set themselves to act with moderation and to endure with patience. The great danger which they will have to guard against is the impatience and impetuosity of their more advanced colleagues of the Left. As for the Government, my conviction is that it will begin by throwing over the one man who might have saved it—Count Witté. Then it will literally revel in repression. He will probably have gone long before the June number of the REVIEW is in the hands of its readers. I should not be surprised if his successor were the weak-minded, short-sighted official, M. Goremykin, who for some time past has been giving well-meant but ruinous counsel to the Tsar, and whose influence was to some extent moderated by the indignation of Count Witté.

Unless I am greatly mistaken, the advent to power of M. Goremykin will portend the speedy dissolution of the Duma, the recrudescence of the reaction and the renewal of the insurrection, with dire consequences to the Russian people.

BERLIN, May, 1906.

GERMANY, after twelve months of excitement in the domain of foreign politics, is in an introspective mood. In parliament and in the press, her politicians and writers are engaged in analyzing the causes of her unpopularity and inquiring why her

character and aspirations should be, as the Speech from the Throne alleged, maliciously "misjudged abroad." Many of them seem disposed to attribute the evil to a lack of international tact. Accordingly, they have started a campaign of reprobation against those of their compatriots who habitually act in the spirit of a recent Imperial oration, glorifying the German people as "the salt of the earth." Self-praise is proverbially no recommendation, and these moral censors have, consequently, pilloried, first and foremost, the vice of depreciating other nations by boastfully exaggerating the triumphs of German commerce, industry and shipping. Invidious methods of comparison, such as those systematically practised in the Fatherland, form a more prolific source of international hatred, they affirm, than even the envy which the astonishing prosperity of the Empire is generally supposed to excite among its rivals. And they add that the pernicious effects of these sins of arrogance are considerably enhanced by the blunders of a large body of German politicians, whom they accuse of canvassing impossible schemes of conquest to the grave detriment of the national interests. These buccaneer protagonists of a Greater Germany, with their prodigious theories of racial consolidation, have successively offended the susceptibilities of almost all the great nations of the earth. One of their earliest acts of fatuity was to impress upon the mind of the United States their vision of large and thriving communities in Brazil becoming affiliated to the German Empire. What folly, exclaim the censors, to proclaim from the housetops the existence of such ambitions, and, by thus gratuitously fanning the flames of Monroeism, to render them forever impossible of realization. And as in the United States, so in Holland, Belgium, Denmark and Austria-Hungary, the predatory projects advertised by the Pan-Germanic League have proved a constant obstacle to the complete success of the Imperial diplomacy; while in Turkey the effusions of Pan-German agents have greatly retarded the slow and laborious process of inspiring the Sultan with confidence in the disinterestedness of his Berlin advisers. Even Russia has been forced to submit, in recent months, to the insult implied by the public discussion in the German press of the advisability of annexing the Baltic Provinces. Now, can it be deemed surprising, the preachers of political discretion inquire, if the nations of Europe, in view

of these wanton incitements to conquest, should contemplate the desirability of organizing themselves into a league of resistance against the perils embodied in the theories of Pan-Germanism?

The Pan-Germans show no signs of abating their activity in consequence of these attacks. They declare that it is their duty, regardless of foreign susceptibilities, to awaken the nation from what they term its political lethargy, and to prepare it for the pregnant hour when circumstances shall favor the consummation of their ideals. Their agitation, they argue, is a purely domestic affair; and it is within the province, as it is the business, of the Government, by disowning all association with the movement, to counteract any detrimental effect which it may exercise abroad. They are willing, they protest, to be abused as rantors if only the Government will act on occasion in the spirit of their theories. But this, they complain, the Government appears incapable of doing. Instead of conceding a monopoly of "words" to the agitators and confining itself to "deeds," it invariably fails to satisfy the "land-hunger" of the nation, while indulging its oratorical instinct to the full. This charge the Pan-Germans substantiate by reference to the Moroccan crisis, and they assert that, if German policy is the object of almost universal suspicion, the fault lies not with them, but with the Government and the Emperor, whom they describe as the victims of their own loquacity. In this argument, in so far as it applies to the sovereign, the Pan-Germans are supported by the representatives of almost every political party; for it is observed that, though the Emperor has kept the peace for eighteen years, yet he has endangered it, times without number, by his speeches. The sincerity of the frequent proclamations in which the monarch has avowed his determination never to pursue a policy of territorial conquest is seldom, if ever, questioned; but the apprehension is wide-spread throughout the nation that, in an unguarded moment, he may commit himself to some word or action from which a pacific retreat may prove impossible. These misgivings have been quickened by the Moroccan imbroglio, arising out of the Imperial visit to Tangier—a step that has been condemned as provocative even by staunch supporters of the Government,—and by the significant communication in which Prince Bülow intimated last summer that, in a few years' time, when the dignity of the Emperor would no longer be

directly involved in the affair, the French, if they "knew how to wait," might reasonably expect to reap the fulfilment of their policy. In other words, German diplomacy was fettered and the tranquillity of Europe disturbed by the necessity of safeguarding the prestige of the Crown in a situation to which it should never have been exposed. The case is in no sense unique, and a review of the last two decades of German foreign policy discloses a long series of crises aggravated, if not precipitated, by the rhetoric of the Emperor, whose "winged phrases," it is urged, have supplied the foreign opponents of Germany with more polemical material than all the publications of the Pan-German League put together. In these circumstances, Dr. Theodor Barth, the Liberal deputy, who, though no expansionist, is a consistent advocate of a vigorous foreign policy, has stepped forward with the curious suggestion that, in future, a definite distinction shall be drawn between the utterances of the monarch and those of the Government. He declares that the time has arrived for the world to recognize that the oratorical performances of William II must be regarded not as official pronouncements, or as the expression of Imperial policy, but merely as the reflection of his own individuality. It is undeniably the case that in Germany the preeminent personality of the monarch has exercised a detrimental effect on the nation, in so far as it has prevented the development of independent individualities in the administration. Its constant intervention in the details of politics has, too, according to the testimony of men of such widely divergent views as Herr von Kardorff and the late Eugen Richter, appreciably diminished the fervor of the national loyalty to the monarchical idea, which was one of the most edifying features of the reign of Emperor William I. Of this the instructive comments of Dr. Barth furnish impressive confirmation. His suggestions are, of course, utterly unrealizable, and it is only necessary to imagine, for a moment, the bewildering effect of a formal notification to the world that Imperial speeches must not be confused with Governmental actions in order to appreciate their practical absurdity. Nor is it to be expected, as Dr. Barth seems to anticipate, that the nations of Europe will gradually learn to distinguish for themselves between the personal and official opinions of the Emperor.

The bitter controversy excited between the nations of the

Triple Alliance by the Emperor's telegram to Count Goluchowsky, at the conclusion of the Morocco Conference, affords a fresh illustration of this obvious circumstance. That document gravely embarrassed the statesmen of Vienna by exhibiting their diplomacy in a light of hostility to France, and it exasperated public opinion beyond the Apennines by its implied threat of punishing Italy for her alleged disloyalty to the Alliance in supporting France at Algeciras. Like most of the Emperor's utterances, the message had, however, the possibly unconscious merit of candidly revealing the true state of German official feeling in regard to the European situation. That feeling, after as before the Conference, is mainly inspired by resentment at the isolation of Germany in the concert of Europe.

When Italy first joined the Triple Alliance, she was prompted thereto by various motives which are no longer present in the minds of her statesmen. She was threatened at all points by France. She feared the Republic in its character as the political ally of the Vatican, and she sympathized with Germany as the great Protestant Power whose policy was vigorously opposed to the temporal authority of the Pope. By France her future interests in Northern Africa were menaced with annihilation; and of Germany she required protection, not only against France, but also against Austrian expansion in the Balkans. As a member of the Triple Alliance, and supported by the sea-power of Great Britain, Italy might reasonably expect to prevent the development of an overwhelming French predominance in the Mediterranean. But, with the lapse of years, these considerations have undergone a radical change. In Protestant Germany, the Roman Catholic party has acquired a preponderating influence, and the German Emperor is compelled, by reasons of domestic policy, to cultivate relations of intimacy with the Pope, with whom France, on the other hand, is now on terms of open hostility. Moreover, the French Government has agreed to recognize the Italian claim to preemption in Tripoli, to which the diplomacy of Berlin, out of regard for the Sultan of Turkey, is necessarily opposed. And, finally, Great Britain, in complete estrangement from Germany, has become the firm friend and future ally of France, who no longer threatens the integrity of Italy.

These changes have essentially modified the character of the

Triple Alliance. As Count Guicciardini, the Minister of Foreign Affairs at Rome, explained in his recent declaration to the Chamber, friendship with Great Britain was from the outset a primary condition of Italian adhesion to the Alliance. That friendship Italy is not prepared to renounce; but, relying upon Prince von Bülow's official disclaimers of hostility to Great Britain and upon the statements made in Paris and London that the Anglo-French *entente* is directed against no third Power, Italy will continue to regard the Alliance as the basis of her policy, which aims at the maintenance of the *status quo* in the Balkans and the preservation of the European peace. Germany is eminently dissatisfied with the Italian Minister's explanations. Some years ago, when Italy, in Prince von Bülow's phrase, began her "extra dance" with France, the performance enjoyed the approval of Berlin, which was then hoping to effect a diplomatic coalition against Great Britain. The relations between Rome and London were at that juncture far from cordial, and the Franco-Italian agreement regarding Morocco and Tripoli was interpreted as a blow aimed at British interests in the Mediterranean. Unfortunately for Germany, British diplomacy proved equal to the occasion; and France, instead of approximating to Germany, cast in her lot with Great Britain. The Moroccan crisis was precipitated and the Algeciras Conference convened in the conviction that it would effect a regrouping of the Powers in favor of Germany. While that Conference was proceeding, Professor Delbrück explained to the world that the fate of Morocco was in reality a matter of indifference to Germany. He admitted that the marvellous prosperity of Egypt under British rule, and the orderly conditions prevailing in Herzegovina and Bosnia, were convincing illustrations of the beneficent operation of the principle of entrusting to one Power the duty of administering an uncivilized country, while Macedonia might be quoted as a significant example of the confusion attendant upon international control. Germany could well afford, he indicated, to give France a free hand in Morocco; but she would run the risk of war rather than allow that country to enter into coalitions with other Powers with the object of excluding her from the business of world politics. Hence Germany, as an object-lesson of her power, would insist on the principle of "internationality" in the Shereefian Empire. The Conference is now

over. But Germany is still discontented, and she is venting her discontent on those Governments which failed to act at Algeciras in accordance with her expectations. Spain has been informed that the Emperor will not this year return the visit paid to Berlin by King Alfonso; Italy has been threatened with the eventuality of German support to Austrian expansion in the Balkans; and Russia, who refused to ignore the obligations of the Dual Alliance, has been deprived of the advantage of German co-operation in her latest foreign loan. These measures can scarcely be considered an effective remedy for the isolation of Germany in Europe, and they are vigorously condemned by that large section of public opinion which perceives in the "bullying tactics" of the Imperial Government the real cause of the many failures which characterize its foreign policy.

Apart from Austria-Hungary, the relations of Germany with the United States are regarded as the only satisfactory feature of the international outlook. It is claimed that Baron Speck von Sternburg has succeeded in definitely "curing" President Roosevelt of the illusion that the two great branches of the Anglo-Saxon race are destined to cooperate in the domain of international politics. It is now deemed to be the task of the German press to complete the work of conversion begun by the Ambassador, and to persuade the American nation that it must join with Germany in redressing the balance of power in Europe. Professor Delbrück and the semi-official "*Grenzboten*" are, accordingly, laboring hard to demonstrate the inherent antagonism between the interests of the United States and those of the British Empire. President Roosevelt's recent address to the German veterans they interpret as a signal proof that America is rapidly moving in the direction of an alliance with Germany against the power of Great Britain. From which it may be seen that Berlin politicians are still incapable of liberating themselves from the Bismarckian principle that to sow discord between the other Powers is the surest means of promoting the influence of the German Empire.

WASHINGTON, May, 1906.

WHEN the discussion of the railway-rate bill was resumed in the Senate on May 17th, there seemed to be good ground for believing that the measure in its amended form would be passed by

that body before its adjournment on that day. Senator Tillman, however, posed a question which may occupy for some time the constitutional lawyers in the Upper House of the Federal Legislature. The bill, as it stands, confers power on the Interstate Commerce Commission to prescribe what, "in its judgment," would be a just and reasonable rate. Senator Tillman, who has the bill in charge, declared that he would not be responsible for the retention of the words quoted, if there was any doubt about their constitutionality. Senator Teller said that, for his part, he had never heard any satisfactory reason given for the insertion of the words. Senators Allison and Dolliver, who have been conspicuous among the Senators that have favored a restrictive court review, undertook to explain why the words should be retained. Senator Allison asserted that they conferred discretion upon the Commission and limited the scope of the court review. Senator Dolliver concurred in considering the words useful for those purposes, and, to show their constitutionality, recalled that Senator Knox of Pennsylvania had commended them in a speech made at Pittsburg, and had employed them in a bill introduced by him in the Senate. Mr. Knox replied that in his opinion the words were useless, and, if allowed to remain, would probably render the bill unconstitutional. He admitted that he had used them in his Pittsburg speech, but this had been done, he said, without due consideration of their true import, and, although he had put them into his bill, for reasons which he recited, he maintained that the fact did not commit him in any way to approval of them. He had arrived, he added, at the conviction that the words would probably be construed to mean a delegation of legislative power to the Interstate Commerce Commission, and would therefore be regarded by the Supreme Court as making the law unconstitutional. He believed the words should be excised, and notified the Senate that he would not be held responsible for their presence in the bill. Senator Foraker concurred with Senator Knox in thinking that the words, "in its judgment," clearly constituted a delegation of legislative powers, for which reason both he and Senator Bailey denounced the bill as unconstitutional. The impression prevails that, ultimately, the phrase will be stricken out of the measure.

The bill, in its amended form, is, of course, far from being

what President Roosevelt and the Anti-Railroad Senators desire. They would have been satisfied originally with the enactment of the Hepburn Bill in the form which it bore when it left the House of Representatives; but, if it was to be amended at all, they desired the insertion of a clause, expressly limiting the powers of a United States Circuit Court to review the decision of the Commission, and especially the power to suspend by injunction the operation of a rate made by the Commission pending the adjudication of its validity. It soon became clear that to pass an amendment of that kind would require the votes of at least twenty-five Democratic Senators, as well as twenty of their Republican colleagues. In the hope of effecting such a combination, Senators Tillman and Bailey conferred with Attorney-General Moody, and an agreement was eventually reached by the three conferees as to the wording of an amendment intended to restrict a court's power of review. Whether such an amendment could have been passed under any circumstances will now never be known; but both Senator Tillman and Senator Bailey have expressed the belief that a bare majority could have been secured for it. President Roosevelt, however, evidently having arrived at the opposite conclusion, suddenly abandoned the attempt to effect a winning combination of Democrats and Anti-Railroad Republicans, and, without notifying Senator Tillman or Senator Bailey, or even, apparently, Attorney-General Moody, announced to a number of newspaper correspondents that he had decided to approve an amendment distinctly recognizing the powers of a United States Circuit Court to review rates made by the Commission, including the power to suspend a rate by injunction. The only material concessions made by the Railroad Senators were that a carrier's application for an injunction must be heard by three judges instead of one judge, and that there should be an expedited appeal from their decision to the Supreme Court. On this crucial point, therefore, about which there has been so much debate, it cannot be denied that the Railroad Senators have gained a decisive victory. Satisfied with this triumph, however, they seemed disposed to let their Anti-Railroad colleagues have their way with regard to many subsequent amendments of the Hepburn-Tillman measure, amendments by which the interests of railway companies and of the Standard Oil corporation have been sweepingly satisfied.

One of the most unpleasant incidents ever witnessed on the floor of the Senate followed a speech in which Senator Tillman recounted the efforts which had been made by Mr. Roosevelt to bring about a combination of Democratic Senators with Anti-Railroad Republican colleagues, and in which he expressed some resentment at the sudden abandonment of those efforts without notice to the Democratic Senators concerned in the negotiations. He plainly intimated that, in his opinion, the President had been guilty of an act of bad faith. In the course of his speech, Mr. Tillman had read from a memorandum made by ex-Senator Chandler the statement that, in conversation about the Hepburn-Tillman bill, Mr. Roosevelt had said that Senators Knox, Spooner and Foraker were trying, by ingenious constitutional arguments, to impair or defeat the bill. There was, on the face of it, nothing improper in such a remark on Mr. Roosevelt's part, and not one of the three Senators named would be likely to dispute its truth. Nevertheless, when Senator Lodge telephoned to the White House the statement that had been made by Senator Tillman on ex-Senator Chandler's authority, the President impulsively authorized him to denounce it on the floor of the Senate as "an unqualified and deliberate lie." This the Senator from Massachusetts proceeded to do, heedless of the fact that such language was shamefully out of place in a legislative body. A painful sensation was produced, not only in the Senate, but throughout the country, when people realized that the Chief Magistrate of the United States had arraigned an ex-Senator as the author, and a Senator as the endorser and sponsor, of a lie. It is universally recognized that Mr. Tillman, in his subsequent reply to the insulting arraignment, comported himself with admirable dignity and self-control. The temperate and manly letter, also, in which ex-Senator Chandler upheld the truth of the statement, contradicted so hastily and angrily by the President, was not only calculated, but qualified, to carry conviction to impartial readers. He riveted public attention on the fact that, not only was there a question of veracity between him and Mr. Roosevelt as to what had been uttered by the latter, but that another grave issue had been raised, to wit, whether the President, in his treatment of Senators Tillman and Bailey, had not been guilty of an act of perfidy. Subsequently, an attempt was made in two newspapers, published, respectively, in

Chicago and in New York, to defend Mr. Roosevelt from the charge of bad faith, on the ground that Mr. Chandler had told him that Senator Tillman suspected Senator Bailey of an inclination to cooperate with the Railroad Republican Senators in favor of giving the United States Circuit Courts large powers of review. This defence has by no means improved the President's position. The scrap of documentary evidence adduced in support of the assertion made by the two newspapers is, on the face of it, inadequate; and, when examined in the light of Mr. Chandler's testimony, is seen to be worthless. The indignation with which Senator Bailey repelled the imputation of bad faith was entirely justified, and he undoubtedly commands the sympathy of the Senate and of all fair-minded men in the community.

The other incident of great public interest which occurred in Washington during the first seventeen days of May was the report made by the Senate Committee on Interoceanic Canals. The report, which was adopted by a vote of 6 to 4, recommends to the Senate a bill providing for a sea-level canal across the Isthmus of Panama. The measure favored by the Committee directs the construction of a sea-level canal in accordance with a report and plan adopted by a majority of the Board of Consulting Engineers for the Panama Canal, created by an order of the President dated June 24th, 1905. The reasons why a majority of the Senate Committee prefer a sea-level type for the canal to the lock type (for which four of their colleagues voted) may be summed up as follows: the sea-level type is acknowledged, even by the advocates of a lock system, to be the ideal type for an international waterway, and the possibility of realizing it on the Isthmus of Panama was one of the chief arguments for selecting that route; secondly, a sea-level canal will be much more convenient than the lock type, and the maintenance of it will be easier and cheaper; then, again, its construction will be attended by no more, and probably less, hazard than that of a waterway requiring 170 feet of lockage and enormous earth dams resting on doubtful alluvial foundations; lastly, but a little longer time—the report estimates the excess at two years—will be consumed in its construction than would be required for one with locks of such unprecedented magnitude as are contemplated in the minority report. The decisive cause

of the adoption of the sea-level type by a majority of the Senate Committee is undoubtedly the San Francisco earthquake. But for that catastrophe, the attention of the Committee, and of the community at large, would probably not have been attracted to the indisputable fact that the immunity of the Isthmus of Panama from serious seismic disturbance cannot be taken for granted. Many destructive earthquakes have occurred in Central America and in Venezuela, and historical records show that the Isthmus itself has not been free from shock.

As regards the question of cost, which hitherto has seemed to constitute the most formidable obstacle to the acceptance of a sea-level type, the majority report of the Committee points out that, although nominally the difference in the cost of the two types is about \$110,000,000, yet this amount is practically reduced by \$40,000,000, representing the difference in the cost of maintenance—about \$800,000 a year in favor of the sea-level type—which, if capitalized at two per cent., would yield the sum just named. The report adds \$10,000,000 for the cost of the 118,000 acres that would be submerged by the lock plan, bringing the total cost of that type up to \$190,000,000. The net difference in cost would, therefore, be only \$60,000,000, which, though a large sum in itself, is considered by the Committee small, in view of the magnitude of the issues involved. It is understood, of course, that the sea-level canal recommended by the majority of the Board of Consulting Engineers, and now favored by the Senate Committee on Interoceanic Waterways, could not claim the title of the Straits of Panama, and differs from the Suez Canal in that it has tide-locks, and, also, a high dam at Gamboa, which is exposed to injury by earthquakes. Recognizing the last-named point of weakness, the majority report of the Committee points out that, whereas the locks provided for in the minority reports advocating the lock type would, for the most part, rest on alluvial foundations, extremely likely to crack in the event of seismic disturbance, the Gamboa dam is to rest upon solid rock reinforced by strong walls, and buttressed at either end by walls of rock. It seems a pity that, if the sea-level type is to be preferred, a precise counterpart of the Suez Canal cannot be secured, and a broad, lockless channel opened between the Atlantic and the Pacific.